Preface
8:03
Lu par Joanne Turner
Conclusions of the Commission
38:05
Lu par Joanne Turner
Conclusions of the Commission, concluded
22:59
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1
38:26
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2
45:54
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3
17:57
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos
30:09
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis
18:16
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
20:26
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance
12:11
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives
25:53
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities
19:24
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management
12:00
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash
12:11
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance
13:26
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth
8:47
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization
17:04
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending
6:19
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
5:33
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators
19:20
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force
19:39
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium
18:12
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
4:42
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending
12:52
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position
4:02
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"
10:44
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"
5:45
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
1:18
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
10:21
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan
32:56
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit
6:49
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
17:23
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check
16:09
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace
13:09
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
3:24
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. The CDO Machine
7:50
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. We Created the Investor
22:21
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function
10:33
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest
10:51
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street
10:28
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
17:16
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy
18:33
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
19:27
Lu par Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
2:55
Lu par Joanne Turner
Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"
15:00
Lu par Joanne Turner
Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments
22:31
Lu par Joanne Turner
Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
24:27
Lu par Joanne Turner
Regulators: markets will always self-correct
14:56
Lu par Joanne Turner
Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance
11:08
Lu par Joanne Turner
Lehman: From Moving to Storage
7:47
Lu par Joanne Turner
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices
11:36
Lu par Joanne Turner
2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool
12:30
Lu par Joanne Turner
Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals
17:05
Lu par Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
1:39
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"
9:52
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"
24:17
Lu par Joanne Turner
Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"
18:04
Lu par Joanne Turner
AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"
8:42
Lu par Joanne Turner
Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"
12:28
Lu par Joanne Turner
Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"
7:29
Lu par Joanne Turner
Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"
23:34
Lu par Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
2:20
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"
29:56
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"
8:04
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"
4:50
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"
10:10
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"
13:22
Lu par Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11
2:33
Lu par Joanne Turner
Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries
7:02
Lu par Joanne Turner
Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive
13:59
Lu par Joanne Turner
Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
16:01
Lu par Joanne Turner
Rating Agencies
4:27
Lu par Joanne Turner
AIG: Well Bigger
7:39
Lu par Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12
0:56
Lu par Joanne Turner
Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro
2:06
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"
5:42
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"
8:29
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"
4:40
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"
4:04
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"
6:19
Lu par Cbteddy
Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
1:39
Lu par Cbteddy
Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)
2:42
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"
11:50
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"
22:26
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"
32:30
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"
7:47
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"
9:16
Lu par mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
1:15
Lu par mpinedag
Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)
3:48
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"
4:06
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"
3:56
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"
9:15
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"
11:06
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"
4:42
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"
2:49
Lu par Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
1:16
Lu par Cbteddy
Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)
2:38
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"
8:36
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"
5:16
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"
7:39
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"
7:12
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"
26:35
Lu par mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
1:19
Lu par mpinedag
Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)
3:28
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "A good time to buy"
5:04
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The only game in town"
3:30
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"
6:38
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"
3:58
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"
8:45
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"
6:22
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"
7:31
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"
3:37
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"
1:16
Lu par Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
2:26
Lu par Cbteddy
Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)
4:37
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"
7:17
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"
3:38
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "Spook the market"
11:07
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "Imagination hat"
8:19
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "Heads of family"
3:38
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"
3:20
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"
8:02
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"
3:48
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 18 "A calamity"
12:42
Lu par mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
2:30
Lu par mpinedag
Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)
5:14
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"
6:56
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Spillover effect"
10:50
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"
5:18
Lu par Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
3:07
Lu par Cbteddy
Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)
7:45
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"
10:36
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"
13:07
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"
6:26
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"
4:16
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"
18:26
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"
18:03
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"
10:19
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"
11:15
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"
13:17
Lu par mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
2:45
Lu par mpinedag
Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)
4:17
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"
12:15
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"
9:54
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"
5:09
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"
8:06
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"
3:18
Lu par Cbteddy
Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"
6:39
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"
6:37
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"
5:39
Lu par mpinedag
Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"
5:26
Lu par mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
1:01
Lu par mpinedag
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
1:19
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?
7:09
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis
2:26
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis
6:10
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy
8:30
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble
8:35
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets
7:28
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed
9:32
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure
13:52
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic
6:39
Lu par Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing
3:50
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
23:30
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
7:41
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages
15:59
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects
13:03
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages
4:20
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS
7:58
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?
17:17
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion
4:40
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro
3:26
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system
3:21
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin
34:12
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro
9:00
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role
7:34
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards
35:58
Lu par Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1
27:41
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2
28:32
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages
10:15
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing
5:10
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act
22:13
Lu par mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion
2:37
Lu par mpinedag
